Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy

The Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy (Russian: Корсунь-Шевченковская операция, Ukrainian: Корсунь-Шевченківська операція), or the battle of the Korsun–Cherkasy pocket, was a World War II battle fought from 24 January to 16 February 1944 in the course of the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive in Ukraine following the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive.

Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy pocket
Part of the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive on the Eastern Front of World War II

Red Army assault force on T-26 light tank in Korsun-Shevchenkovski region.
Date24 January – 16 February 1944
Location
Result Soviet victory and successful encirclement.
Belligerents
 Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein
Otto Wöhler
Hermann Breith
Wilhelm Stemmermann 
Georgy Zhukov
Nikolai Vatutin
Ivan Konev
Strength
60,000 men in pocket
59 tanks in pocket
242 artillery pieces in pocket
80,000 men (reinforcement)
III Panzer Corps (201 tanks) (reinforcement)
XLVII Panzer Corps (58 tanks) (reinforcement)
336,700 men
524 tanks (initially)
400 tanks (reinforcement)
1,054 aircraft
5,300 artillery pieces and mortars
Casualties and losses

In the pocket:

  • 30,000 killed, captured and wounded

Outside the pocket:

Total: ~40,000 men
300 tanks and assault guns
50 aircraft

Total: ~80,188


24,286 killed or missing
55,902 wounded and sick
728 tanks

In the battle, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respectively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, encircled German forces of Army Group South in a pocket near the Dnieper River. During weeks of fighting, the two Red Army Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encircled German units attempted a breakout in coordination with a relief attempt by other German forces, resulting in heavy casualties, estimates of which vary.

The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Cherkassy offensive marked the successful implementation of Soviet deep operations. Soviet deep battle doctrine envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defences to allow fresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough by driving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. The arrival of large numbers of American- and British-built trucks and halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had had before. This, coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations in reserve gave the Red Army the ability to drive deep behind German defenses again and again.

Though the Soviet operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in the German front that the Soviet command had hoped for, it marked a significant deterioration in the strength available to the German army on that front, especially in heavy weaponry, nearly all of which was lost during the breakout. Through the rest of the war the Red Army would place large German forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hallmark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.