Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy
The Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy (Russian: Корсунь-Шевченковская операция, Ukrainian: Корсунь-Шевченківська операція), or the battle of the Korsun–Cherkasy pocket, was a World War II battle fought from 24 January to 16 February 1944 in the course of the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive in Ukraine following the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive.
Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy pocket | |||||||
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Part of the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive on the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||
Red Army assault force on T-26 light tank in Korsun-Shevchenkovski region. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Germany | Soviet Union | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Erich von Manstein Otto Wöhler Hermann Breith Wilhelm Stemmermann † |
Georgy Zhukov Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
60,000 men in pocket 59 tanks in pocket 242 artillery pieces in pocket 80,000 men (reinforcement) III Panzer Corps (201 tanks) (reinforcement) XLVII Panzer Corps (58 tanks) (reinforcement) |
336,700 men 524 tanks (initially) 400 tanks (reinforcement) 1,054 aircraft 5,300 artillery pieces and mortars | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
In the pocket:
Outside the pocket:
300 tanks and assault guns 50 aircraft |
Total: ~80,188 24,286 killed or missing 55,902 wounded and sick 728 tanks |
In the battle, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respectively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, encircled German forces of Army Group South in a pocket near the Dnieper River. During weeks of fighting, the two Red Army Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encircled German units attempted a breakout in coordination with a relief attempt by other German forces, resulting in heavy casualties, estimates of which vary.
The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Cherkassy offensive marked the successful implementation of Soviet deep operations. Soviet deep battle doctrine envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defences to allow fresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough by driving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. The arrival of large numbers of American- and British-built trucks and halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had had before. This, coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations in reserve gave the Red Army the ability to drive deep behind German defenses again and again.
Though the Soviet operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in the German front that the Soviet command had hoped for, it marked a significant deterioration in the strength available to the German army on that front, especially in heavy weaponry, nearly all of which was lost during the breakout. Through the rest of the war the Red Army would place large German forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hallmark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.