Berghuis v. Thompkins
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court considered the position of a suspect who understands their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona and is aware that they have the right to remain silent, but does not explicitly invoke or waive the right.
| Berghuis v. Thompkins | |
|---|---|
Supreme Court of the United States | |
| Argued March 1, 2010 Decided June 1, 2010 | |
| Full case name | Mary Berghuis, Warden v. Van Chester Thompkins |
| Docket no. | 08-1470 |
| Citations | 560 U.S. 370 (more) 130 S. Ct. 2250; 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 |
| Argument | Oral argument |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Defendant convicted; aff'd, Mich. Ct. App., February 3, 2004 (per curiam, unpublished); review denied, 683 N.W.2d 676 (Mich. 2004); petition denied, E.D. Mich.; rev'd, 547 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2008); cert. granted, 557 U.S. 965 (2009). |
| Holding | |
| A suspect's silence during interrogation does not invoke their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona. The invocation of that right must be unambiguous, and silence is not enough to invoke it. Voluntarily and knowingly responding to police interrogation after remaining silent constitutes a waiver of the right to remain silent, provided that a Miranda warning was given and the suspect understood it. Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito |
| Dissent | Sotomayor, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends. V, VI | |
The Court held that unless and until the suspect actually states that they are relying on their right(s), their subsequent voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to interact with (or question) them. The mere act of remaining silent is, on its own, insufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights. Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as to implying a waiver.
The Court was split, 5–4. The dissent, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that Miranda and other previous cases had required a claimed waiver of a constitutional right to be shown more strongly, especially in light of a lengthy interrogation with a possible "compelling influence" during which the accused had remained almost entirely silent for almost 3 hours prior to the self-incriminating statement.
Many considered Berghuis a further erosion of Miranda and were concerned it was "turning the clocks back" on safeguards developed in previous cases. At least one scholar has argued that Thompkins effectively gutted Miranda. A common criticism about the opinion is that vulnerable citizens could now be placed under pressure and, despite having an understanding of their rights, could be more easily coerced in a manner prejudicial to their interests.